According to the Malian analyst, who divides his time between Dakar and Bamako, while the formal democratic model may be foundering, democratic values are still being embraced by the people. It is therefore all the more crucial for Western partners to remain engaged in development projects, as expectations of States have never been higher. Yet the military regimes in place are focusing on the aspect of security, while the "new players", namely China, Russia and Turkey – which are in fact not new at all – are interested in business and military cooperation, and hardly in poverty alleviation.

Alliance Sud: Why are fresh coups again occurring in the Sahel?

We are witnessing the return of the army in the three countries of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which already experienced military coups between 2010 and 2014. Unlike other countries in Africa that have had no military putsches since the 1990s, that was in the not very distant past. Besides, the prevailing security and political conditions constitute fertile ground for interference by the military, who see themselves as saviours. In Mali and Burkina Faso, the situation has been deteriorating steadily for the past 10 years, despite the presence of a substantial international stabilisation facility comprising a UN force, French-led military operations, and education and training missions by the European Union.

This has given rise to twofold disenchantment: first, that of the military in the political players, because, despite substantial investments by civilian regimes to improve the capabilities of the security forces, they have not been able to bring the situation of insecurity under control. This all comes against a backdrop of corruption surrounding the purchase of military equipment. Then there is popular disenchantment in the governing elites, who are seen as corrupt following the revelation of numerous embezzlement scandals in a context pervaded by difficult social and economic conditions.

Isn't the popular support for these military regimes surprising, after the significant pro-democracy movement witnessed in West Africa in the early 1990s?

Indeed, there is a striking contrast between the democratic euphoria of 30 years ago and today's popular support for the military. This is because the democratic model that emerged in the early 1990s following the sovereign national conferences is running out of steam. No regime has materialised with the ability to combine political freedom and economic development. Admittedly, the Mali of the 1990s does not resemble that of today, but the progress has been insufficient.

Has the liberal system failed – from both a political and an economic standpoint?

It is in any case the failure of an approach, of a governance model based on formal democracy with declaratory constitutions. Public affairs have not always been managed democratically, and this amidst a decline of the rule of law. This part of Africa has been committed to building electoral democracies, in some instances at the expense of consolidating States truly governed by the rule of law. All of this raises doubts about the democratic status of these countries, especially Mali, which was the showcase of democracy in West Africa (along with Senegal and Ghana) until its downward spiral in 2012 [first coup].

Does this mean that citizens no longer believe in democracy?

I do not believe that they totally reject the democratic model – the topic is ever present in debates and dialogues. However, the practice of democracy involving a party in power that misuses public funds, is no longer acceptable. Instead, most citizens hold fast to the principle of freedom of expression and the people's sovereign choice. This explains why, despite the context of transition, the constitution adopted in Mali in 2023 enshrines democracy as the means of gaining and exercising power.

Yet elections have been postponed indefinitely...

Absolutely. There is a lack of visibility and clarity regarding the time-lines for these transitions, except perhaps in Burkina Faso, where the transition period is expected to end in 2027. The coups occurring in these countries between 2000 and 2020 were followed by short-lived democratic transitions. In Mali it lasted 16 months, in Burkina Faso, 14 months, and in Niger, 15 months.

Today, these transitions purport to be "transformational transitions" as they aim to completely overhaul the country’s "democratic" governance and management so as to identify what works and what does not. The exercise is not futile, but governments are perhaps losing their way in the process, with all the potential abuses associated with holding power for too long. These transitions are also becoming less and less inclusive of all political and social forces. In Niger and Burkina Faso, political activities have been forbidden, and where they are still permitted, there is no dialogue. If the direction of travel is not altered in Mali, the transition could well end in a political impasse.

Are citizens supporting these transitions?

In principle, yes, there is real enthusiasm born of a deep-seated aspiration for change. In 2020, I took part in the national consultations in Mali. The debates were lively, there was a genuine determination to tackle the roots of the problem. They were banking on the ability of a transitional authority, free of certain political constraints and limited in time, to undertake reforms, unlike an elected government, which may be torn between the sometimes contradictory and short-term agendas of its leaders. This has turned out to be more challenging and complex in practice.

The military were expected to improve security, yet things seem to be deteriorating

Security has improved in some places and deteriorated in others. The number of incidents has also increased, as the armed forces are conducting more operations. They now have modern equipment that they did not previously possess, thanks in part to partnerships with Russia, China and Turkey – the latter being the exclusive supplier of drones. These partnerships seem to satisfy the majority of officers and regimes in place, as deliveries are not subject to specific conditions relating to governance and human rights. This gives rise to better equipped and more efficient armies, but also spawns another reality: there are more instances of violence against civilians and a greater risk of collateral victims stemming from the use of drones.

Aren't the increased military budgets and cuts to development cooperation by countries in the North setting back development?

The military regimes have created enormous expectations of the State, which had disappeared in places. Those expectations are being driven by sovereignist rhetoric, which emphasises the primary role of the State in building new roads, infrastructure and providing energy. This rhetoric fuels the belief that States alone can meet these needs, even when they have less funds owing to the political situation and to cuts in development cooperation by the countries in the North and international financial institutions. In Mali, for example, electricity has been an immense challenge for the past two years. Daily life is punctuated with power cuts and the lack of fuel, the economy is not functioning. Strengthening security has sometimes overshadowed the challenges relating to education, health or even the economy.

Does a small country like Switzerland still have a role to play in development cooperation?

Switzerland is, admittedly, a small country, but one with a long-standing tradition of supporting local initiatives. It still enjoys a good reputation, which is not the case of other countries whose cooperation model is being questioned. This relatively favourable opinion and history is conducive to promoting water and power supply projects and to supporting good governance and decentralisation, all of which directly impact the lives of people. Its links with non-State players – civil society organisations, youth and women's organisations – is also an asset even if this is not specific to Switzerland. All this gives a certain legitimacy to its presence in the region.

Like all the players, however, Switzerland is confronting a fairly pronounced change: the region has evolved from one where the international stabilisation facility was crucial – with a strong presence of the UN, the African Union and other partners, especially France – to become an environment where the protagonists are the States. The initial thinking was that it would be possible to circumvent States and work only with civil society and non-governmental organisations, but States are still proving indispensable. They are now back in the driving seat.

Should foreign donors work with non-democratic regimes?

It's a complex dilemma, but the situation will not be improved without efficient States. There is already cooperation with the military regimes, though at times on a smaller scale and in regard to technical matters. Hence, the question is more one of deciding how far the collaboration should go. Western donors like Switzerland have a role to play in the realm of advocacy, they should continue to support development. It is better to remain engaged and take the opportunities and openings where they arise. We are perhaps evolving away from the major problems that have plagued the foreign relations of these regimes up to now, towards realpolitik and the realisation that they need countries like Switzerland, which have a long tradition in tackling non-security challenges. Taking a long-term view is one way of keeping citizens on side, as their memory is longer than that of institutions. This is all the more so considering that non-engagement comes at a price – that of being displaced by strategic competitors.

How do you see long-term relations with China, Turkey and Russia?

There is talk of new allies, but in reality, they are not all that new. These countries have long-standing relations with the Sahel – Russia at least since those countries became independent. There is also China, driven, for example, by its interest in rare earths or its investments in oil in Niger and sugar in Mali, and this is all set to continue. Turkey has new ambitions and is not limiting itself to drone sales to the armies. In Niamey, the new airport and the Radisson Hotel were built by the Turks in the past 10 years. These projects are part of a long-term approach that is likely to continue. For now, however, these players are not involving themselves in the same fields as Westerners, starting with development assistance. For them, it is business first and foremost, with the Sahel countries paying cash for their purchases of military equipment. The biggest contributor of development assistance in Mali is the United States. Should the 90-day freeze on American aid decreed by Donald Trump be prolonged, that would compound an already precarious situation. It is hardly likely that the Europeans will replace the Americans in this realm, and even less so the Chinese or the Turks.